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Rethinking Article 422:
A Retrospective on Ecuador’s 2008 Constitutional ISDS Recalibration
By Alexander Basil Avtgis *

ABSTRACT
Is Ecuador’s adoption of Article 422 in the 2008 Constitution properly viewed as a
“re-statification”1 of Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)? And, since its
implementation, has the constitutional article been effective in institutionally
insulating Ecuador from the jurisdictional reach of international ISDS? This paper
answers both questions in the negative—but qualifies such an outlook by balancing
the drawbacks of Article 422 against its successes. Article 422’s provisions,
strident in its attempt to create an alternative development vision, did not achieve
all that the Constitution’s drafters had hoped. Nevertheless, in its limited effect of
detaching Ecuador from certain ISDS fora, it did productively reorient the
country’s engagement with external economic forces in a manner that is hopeful.

JD/MPA Candidate at Indiana University’s Maurer School of Law and School of Public and Environmental
Affairs, and founding Editor-in-Chief of the Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design at Maurer’s Center for
Constitutional Democracy. The author would like to extend a deep gratitude to Professor Susan H. Williams and
David C. Williams for all their assistance and patience in offering advice on the (many) drafts of this piece.
1 This term is first used in the title of an article co-authored by the respected international arbitrator, Honorable
Charles N. Brower, and the research scholar, Sadie Blanchard. See Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, From
“Dealing in Virtue” to “Profiting From Injustice”: The Case Against “Re-Statification” of Investment Dispute
Settlement, 55 HARV. INT ’L L. J. 45, 45 (2014).
*
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Article 422(1): Treaties or international instruments where the Ecuadorian State
yields its sovereign jurisdiction to international arbitration entities in disputes
involving contracts or trade between the State and natural persons or legal entities
cannot be entered into.2
"[T]he Constitution itself can no longer pretend anymore to provide a
comprehensive regulatory framework of the state on its own. . . [T]he national
Constitution today and in the future is to be considered a ‘partial constitution,’
which is completed by the other levels of governance.” 3
“[International Investment Arbitration] is rooted in international, extrajurisdictional substitutes for domestic institutional quality. These substitutes . . .
have expanded even more rapidly than domestic investments in governance, and
allow powerful actors to avoid local judicial institutions.” 4
INTRODUCTION
September 2008 heralded much change for Ecuador: its adoption of a new Constitution5 by popular
referendum seemed to turn a new page for the nation. In particular, several of the Constitutio n’s
provisions gave rise to the belief that Ecuador had successfully redesigned a novel approach to
handling foreign investment6 and set forth a strategy to separate the country from any external
influence over the resolution of disputes that arose from investment.7 Specifically, Article 422
prohibited the country from entering into treaties that provided jurisdiction to outside arbitral
tribunals for the resolution of disputes arising between the State and foreign investors.
This paper will assess the goals and effects of Article 422. It will begin with a discussion of the
constitutional mechanism and its textual construction, as well as the contextual anti-neolibe ra l,
alternative development rationale behind its inclusion by the Constituent Assembly in Ecuador’s
2008 Constitution. The paper will then contrast the initial enthusiasm of the government’s three
branches in denouncing the International Investment Treaty framework and Investor State Dispute
Settlement System with a longitudinal assessment of the greater part of the last decade—arguing
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CONST . OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 422(1).
Thomas Cottier & Maya Hertig, The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism, 7 M AX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L.
261, 303–04 (2003). To this effect, this piece is written for constitutional design practitioners, and aspires to lend
perspective into the numerous ways that “[p]owers are increasingly shifted from the national level as embodied to
international and supranational governance structures.” Id. at 302.
4 Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Governance, 25 INT ’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 107–23 (2005).
5 CONST . OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, Oct. 20, 2008.
6 See Christina L. Madden, Laws Gone Wild in Ecuador: Indigenous People and Ecosystems Gain Rights, POL ’Y
INNOVAT IONS (Oct. 2, 2008), http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/briefings/data/000077.
7 See id.
3
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that Article 422, instead of successfully disengaging from the country’s international investor-state
obligations, remains minimally significant in light of the continuing bilateral trade agreements that
still subject the country to the long-arm of international treaty arbitration.
To make this case, the paper will explore four distinct aspects of Article 422, each of which detracts
from Ecuador’s intent to “restatify” ISDS, or completely eliminate any jurisdictional reach of
external ISDS bodies over Ecuador’s international investment agreements: 1) the constitutio na l
article’s inability to remove Ecuador from ongoing, already-initiated arbitration proceedings; 2)
the article’s silence regarding retroactive application of its prohibition on ceding sovereignty, or
regarding a requirement on the government’s behalf to affirmatively remove existing treaties that
directly contradict 422(1); 3) the article’s ambiguity concerning putative treaty claims that arise
from Ecuador’s investment treaty obligations; and 4) the article’s allowance of arbitration clauses
in trade agreements and investment contracts under the exception of 422(2) for “regiona l
arbitration entities,” and the sustained courting of foreign direct investment in certain industr ies
that results. Each of these lacunas in the text of Article 422, left unaccounted for by Constitue nt
Assembly drafters, detracts from the government’s ability to resist neoliberal pressures.
This paper concludes by briefly positing that the functional shortcomings of Article 422 are
nonetheless offset by its symbolic success. Undoubtedly, the end effect of Article 422 is
reorienting the country toward regional, instead of international, solutions—it does not signify an
entire, thorough disengagement from the dominant ISDS paradigm. This should not overshadow
the narrative faculty of Article 422 that is still left intact: the constitutional mechanis m
symbolically instantiates Ecuador’s political, socio-cultural sentiment of the environmenta l,
indigenous concept of Sumak Kawsay (SK), in successful resistance to the prevailing internatio na l
investment framework.
Put differently, the Correa government’s intent for Article 422 to operate as a domestic,
constitutional bulwark against the jurisdiction of international investment arbitration tribunals was
not realized. Nevertheless, its inability to inoculate the government entirely from the norms of
bilateral investment treaties and, by extension, the international economic investment framework ,
should not entirely obscure the Article 422’s underlying role as a “pre-commitment device”8 to an
alternative development vision antithetical to investment liberalization. Article 422, as such,
functions as a constitutional gesture toward regional integration. It is a necessary component in a
constitutional domestic re-configuration9 that paves the way for a South American “hybrid regime

8

Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONST IT UT IONALISM A ND DEMOCRACY 195
(Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988); ST EPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONST RAINT : ON THE THEORY OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 134–77 (1995); JON ELST ER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: ST UDIES IN RAT IONALITY,
PRECOMMIT MENT , A ND CONST RAINTS 129–41, 157–62 (2000).
9 See Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law , 38 NYU J. INT ’L L
& POL. 707, 719–21 (2006).
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for international investment arbitration,”10 premised principally on the regional consortium
embodied by UNASUR’s Arbitration Centre.11
I.

The Legal Recalibration Mechanism of Article 422

Criticism of investment treaty arbitration is not new;12 the onslaught of constitutional challenge s
brought to bear upon the current investor-state paradigm is, however, a rather recent
phenomenon.13 Such challenges invoke constitutional vocabulary, including the principles of
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and fairness.14 The constitutional text of Ecuador’s
Article 422 embodies these challenges—although, as this paper will argue, it fails to affect the full
extent of changes sought in its enactment.
The sentiments of President Correa in urging the Constituent Assembly (“CA”) to draft Article
422 are numerous and generally reflect the anti-neoliberal shift of the South American country
over the previous two decades. But, as this article points out, the choices expressed in the
constitutional mechanism of Article 42215 —that make it the lynchpin of repositioning the country
beyond the jurisdictional reach of the modern international investor-state protection
infrastructure—were insufficient to properly insulate Ecuador from the pressures that force it to
engage, to this day, with the very arbitral tribunal entities from which the country sought to
separate. The President and the CA might have genuinely desired that Article 422 would enable
Ecuador to resist the jurisdiction of distant, foreign, and unfriendly (read favorable-to-investors)
investor-state arbitral tribunals, such as International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(“ICSID”) or any other of the similarly analogous “investment-protection” bodies.16 But this has

10

See Kendall Grant, The ICSID Under Siege: UNASUR And The Rise Of A Hybrid Regime For International
Investment Arbitration (Osgoode Legal Studs., Res. Paper No. 26, 2015), available at
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1103&context=olsrps.
11 See South America Forms Alternative to Free Trade Kangaroo Courts, TELE SUR (Jan. 19, 2016),
http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/UNASUR-Close-to-Forming-Investor-Dispute-Center-20160119-0036.ht ml;
see also UNASUR Arbitration Centre One Step Closer to Being Established , INV. TREAT Y NEWS (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/02/29/unasur-arbitration-centre-one-step-closer-to-being-established. See generally
Silvia Karina Fiezzoni, UNASUR Arbitration Centre: The Present Situation and the Principal Characteristics of
Ecuador’s Proposal, INV. TREAT Y NEWS (Jan. 12, 2012), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/01/12/unasur/.
12 See, e.g., Heinrich Kronstein, Business Arbitration—Instrument of Private Government, 54 YALE L.J. 36
(1944); Heinrich Kronstein, Arbitration is Power, 38 NYU L. REV. 661 (1963).
13 See Stephan W. Schill, Conceptions of Legitimacy of International Arbitration , in PRACT ISING VIRT UE : INSIDE
INT ERNATIONAL A RBITRATION 106, 113 (David D. Caron et al. eds., 2015).
14 Id. at 112.
15 These choices might reflect, perhaps, the Assembly’s own sentiments, separate from President Correa’s or the
general will of the people, in drafting the specific text of the article. Or, in a slightly different vein, the textual
choices expressed in Article 422 might actually represent the des ires of the CA—yet, as practice often differs from
theory, the specific choices in the text reflect the Assembly’s lack of expertise in the technical matters of
international investment law. This latter interpretation, one which highlights the importance in careful, technical
constitutional drafting, is more consistent with the spirit of this paper.
16 See Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the Third World , 8 SAN
DIEGO INT 'L L.J. 345, 373–75 (2007) (arguing that the legitimacy of the ICSID body is critiqued on the grounds that
4

not been the result: the current situation in Ecuador supports a narrative divergent from the
motivating spirit17 and actual text of Article 422.
The new Ecuadorian Constitution recognizes arbitration, as had its predecessor, as a generally
valid alternative dispute mechanism.18 Nevertheless, Article 422 singled out internationa l
arbitration (the context in which investor-states disputes arise) as a mechanism in the panoply of
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) and prohibited certain usages prospectively. As the text of
Article 422(1) reads, treaties19 that “yield [Ecuador’s] sovereign jurisdiction”20 to internationa l
arbitration bodies21 in disputes involving investment22 cannot be entered into.
For President Correa, who entered the executive post two years prior, the Constitution symbolized
an opportunity to recreate the country, to re-establish Amazonian Ecuador upon new
environmental and socio-political principles, and to rebuke the decaying neoliberal economics that
had crippled the nation since the late 1980s. 23 The first twenty-four months in office were full of
far-reaching initiatives and executive actions designed to achieve Correa’s platform, described as
the “citizen’s revolution.”24 But the crucial step to the realization of his goals lay in one of his first
acts as President25 when, in his second decree, Correa called for a popular referendum to take place
and decide whether to convene a national body that would have full powers over crafting a new
constitutional text.26 On April 15, 2007, the country voted in favor of forming the Constituent
Assembly and, a few months later, a representative body charged with crafting a constitution to be
placed for popular vote, was elected.27 Twenty-four national assembly members, 100 provincia l
it adopts a “single economic rationale for investment protection,” devoid of alternative democratic interests of the
host-state and its citizenry).
17 See generally Jonas Gamso, A Case of Diversified Dependency: Macrostructural Change and Policy Alternatives
in Ecuador, 43 LAT IN A M. PERSPS. 109 (2016).
18 CONST . OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 190.
19 For example, the ICSID Convention. See ICSID Convention, INT ’L CT R. FOR SET T LEMENT OF INV. DISPUT ES,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Pages/ICSID-Convention.aspx (last visited May 1, 2016).
20 CONST . OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 422.
21 For example, the ICSID arbitral tribunal. See CONVENT ION ON T HE SETTLEMENT OF INVEST MENT DISPUTES
BET WEEN STATES AND NAT IONALS OF OT HER ST ATES arts. 37–47, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
22 More precisely, the text of Article 422 prevents “contracts or trade between the State and natural persons or legal
entities.” CONST . OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 422.
23 Jennifer N. Collins, Rafael Correa and the Struggle for a New Ecuador, 10 GLOBAL DIALOGUE (2008), available
at http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=426 (“For President Correa and his PAIS Alliance (Country
Alliance) party, the constitution represents a chance to refound Ecuador on new economic, political, and even social
principles, and to exorcise from its body politic the living ghosts of neo -liberalism, political corruption, elite
dominance, and social and economic exclusion.”).
24 See, e.g., Ecuador's Citizens' Revolution: Putting People Before Profit , TELE SUR (Jan. 15, 2016),
http://www.telesurtv.net/english/telesuragenda/Ecuadors-Citizens-Revolution-Putting-People-Before-Profit20150108-0025.ht ml (media coverage of Correa’s platform).
25 See CART ER CT R., FINAL REPORT ON ECUADOR’S A PPROBATORY CONST ITUTIONAL REFERENDUM OF SEPTEMBER
28, 2008 4 (Oct. 25, 2008), https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/15116/uploads.
26 See id.
27 See Collins, supra note 23. For more on the Constituent Assembly, see generally CART ER CT R., REPORT ON T HE
NAT IONAL CONST ITUENT A SSEMBLY OF T HE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR (Jan. 2008),
http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/americas/english_The_Carter_%20Center_Rep
ort1_Ecuador_Constituent_Assembly_January08.pdf.
5

assembly members, and six representatives of migrants living outside the country were selected to
serve in the CA, with the President’s political movement, the Patria Altiva y Soberana (PAIS)
coalition, winning 80 of the 130 elected seats. 28
Article 422 originated within the crucial working committee of the CA entitled “Sovereignty,
International Relations, and Latin American Integration,”29 which drafted rules to place
appropriate strictures upon the government’s capacity to cede sovereignty. With their progress
observed closely by the media,30 the working committee sought to craft constitutional constraints
on the executive’s ability to sign treaties in several contexts. The rules placed
brakes on the executive’s ability to enter into treaties . . . strongly opposed by the
public, such as . . . any future attempt to sign a free-trade agreement with the United
States, something that previous governments pursued even in the face of strong
opposition from the indigenous movement, small farmers, and environmentalists. 31
The Committee was comprised of PAIS members who deeply resented previous governme nts’
systematic disregard for the interests of the Ecuadorean citizenry in favor of neoliberal investme nt
interests.32 Their position toward international investor-state arbitration was to prohibit it
altogether.33 The government, in this way, nodded to the principles of the Calvo Doctrine, which
considered suits between private parties and governments litigated in international fora as
representing an impermissible infringement on the state’s national sovereignty.34 The working
committee, then, wished to forge, within the smithy of the 2008 Constitution, the means to “ensure
the observance of constitutional principles in economic policy.”35 And, accordingly, the finalized
text of Article 422 was held the appropriate mechanism to do so.36

28

See CART ER CT R., supra note 25, at 4.
See KAT IA FACH GOMEZ, ECUADOR’S A T T AINMENT OF S UMAK KAWSAY AND THE ROLE A SSIGNED T O
INT ERNATIONAL A RBITRATION (Aug. 4, 2011) (draft at 4), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1904715. Also, the success of the working group is surprising:
halfway into the Assembly’s six-month tenure, the only committee to have managed to approve constitutional
articles for consideration by the plenary was the Committee on Sovereignty, International Relations and Latin
American Integration. See Ecuador: The Constituent Assembly's Three Month Benchmark, WikiLeaks (Mar. 6,
2008), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08QUITO223_a.html.
30 The working group was observed in the international media, s ee, e.g., Emmanuel Gaillard, Anti-Arbitration
Trends in Latin America, 239 N.Y. L.J. No. 108 (Jun. 5, 2008), as well as its domestic counterpart, see, e.g., Solo los
arbitrajes de la región serán admitidos por la Constitución , Editorial, EL COMERCIO, May 21, 2008 (translated as
“Only Arbitrations in The Region Will Be Supported by the Constitution”).
31 Collins, supra note 23.
32 See id.
33 See Eric Gillman, The End of Investor-State Arbitration in Ecuador? An Analysis of Article 422 of the
Constitution of 2008, 19 A M. REV. INT ’L A RB. 269, 291 (2008).
34 See id.
35 Claudia Müller-Hoff, How Does the New Constitutionalism Respond to the Human Rights Challenges Posed by
Transnational Corporations?, in NEW CONST IT UTIONALISM IN LAT IN A MERICA: PROMISES AND PRACT ICES 333, 333
(Detlef Nolte & Almut Schilling-Vacaflor eds., 2012).
36 See GOMEZ , supra note 29, at 5, n.13.
29
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Note that within the Ecuadorian context those constitutional principles mentioned above include
norms consistent in large part with the achievement of “Sumak Kawsay” (“SK”), or the Quechuan
concept of “Buen Vivir,” or “Good Living.”37 SK is understood as a “system of . . . living based
on the communion of humans and nature and on the spatial-temporal harmonious totality of
existence.”38 As one commentator notes:
In all, Sumak Kawsay, or its Spanish translation, is mentioned 25 times in
Ecuador’s Constitution. Most importantly, it is mentioned in the Constitutio n’s
prologue in the context of the country wanting to create “a new form of citizen
coexistence, in diversity and harmony with nature, to achieve “living well”, Sumak
Kawsay”. The concept has its own chapter with 25 articles describing to
Ecuadorians their basic rights associated with it, but no clear definition is given.
The rights include the right to live in a healthy environment, rights to education,
access to water, freedom of association, and access to health.39
Per this perspective, Article 422 functions as the constitutional mechanism aimed at unhinging the
country from the dominant ISDS paradigm—that, in turn, serves as one step in a larger,
multifaceted approach in achieving the “people’s right” to SK.40
II.

The Initial Impacts of Article 422

This paper turns next to the initial enthusiasm surrounding the passage of Article 422. Each of
Ecuador’s three government branches employed the article in different ways. The summation of
their combined efforts, all aimed toward the goal of detaching the country from the Internatio na l
Investment Treaty framework and dominant ISDS paradigm, remained insufficient. A comparative
bookend sketch of the government’s initial responses illustrates this point.
Article 422 (within the domestic framework of the country’s government, i.e. Ecuador’s
governance vis-à-vis foreign investment) initiated a reflexive hardening of the government against
Investor-State Arbitration. The executive branch led the charge. After an approved plenary request
to the Legislative and Audit Commission41 and a nearly unanimous vote in the National
37

Carlos Zorrilla, The Struggle over Sumak Kawsay in Ecuador, UPSIDE DOWN W ORLD (Apr. 22, 2014),
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/ecuador-archives-49/4810-the-struggle-over-sumak-kawsay-in-ecuador. See
generally DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, RESIST ING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZAT ION: CRIT ICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
INVEST MENT LAW 146–50, 156–58 (2013).
38 Zorrilla, supra note 37.
39 Id.
40 This right to SK, as such, is a life “not based necessarily on an economic-materialistic vision of life and living . . .
but rather one based on cultural understandings of what that living well means.” Id.
41 See Registro Oficial No. 632 – Lunes 13 de Julio de 2009 (R.O. 632, July 13, 2009) (Ecuador) [hereinafter
Registro Oficial], available at http://www.derechoecuador.com/productos/producto/catalogo/registrosoficiales/2009/julio/code/19315/registro-oficial-no-632---lunes-13-de-ju lio -de-2009 (“[T]hat the plenary of the
Legislative and Oversight Commission, at the 44th meeting of June 12, 2009, resolved to approve the complaint
[against ICSID].” (translation by author)).
7

Assembly,42 President Correa signed Executive Decree 1823, planning to end the country’s foreign
commitment as signatories to the ICSID Convention.43 Following the Decree’s declaration of “the
termination of the Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes,” notice of the denunciatio n
was served upon ICSID on July 6, 2009. After the required six-month exit period,44 Ecuador ceased
to be a party to the international convention.45 This exit un-recognized the jurisdiction of ICSID
to resolve international investment claims involving Ecuador.46
On September 28, 2009, by way of Official Letter No. 4766-T-09-2216 GMS, Correa also
requested that the National Assembly denounce various BITs on grounds that they contained
provisions contrary to Article 422.47 The National Assembly returned this request on procedural
grounds—Correa’s request required the country’s Constitutional Court to determine the treaties as
unconstitutional. Starting in June 2010, the Court began to issue a series of judgments declaring
the unconstitutionality of articles within the BITs with the United Kingdom, Germany, China,
Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and France. 48 For the majority of the BITs submitted to the
Court, the provisions in contest were the BIT’s dispute resolution clauses that, when constructed
to submit putative disputes to ICSID or other ISDS-dominant arbitration schemes, directly
conflicted with Article 422 of the 2008 Constitution. 49 Since then, the Court has also added to the
list similar provisions under BITs entered into agreement with, inter alia, Venezuela, Chile,
Switzerland, Canada, the United States, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Spain, and Italy.50 Note, though,
42

See Ecuador renunció ayer al Ciadi por decisión de la Comisión Legislativa , EL UNIVERSO, June 13, 2009,
http://www.eluniverso.com/2009/06/ 13/ 1/1355/ 0A1B8191EE3E40D5A 2337486894A24F7.ht ml (“50 votes in favor,
4 votes against and five abstaining votes .” (translation by author)).
43 See Registro Oficial, supra note 41.
44 See Timothy G. Nelson & Marco E. Schnabl, Ecuador Moves to Denounce and Leave the ICSID Convention,
Attempts to Curtail Investor-State Arbitration Rights, LAT IN A M. L. & BUS. REP ., June 30, 2009, at 18, available at
https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/Publications1854_0.pdf.
45 See Eduardo Carmigniani et al., Arbitration 2016, LAT IN LAWYER (Apr. 13, 2016),
http://latinlawyer.com/reference/topics/45/jurisdictions/32/ecuador; see also Nelson & Schnabl, supra note 44, at
18–19.
46 See Nelson & Schnabl, supra note 44, at 18. Regardless, as discussed in the next section, such a denunciation
failed to remove Ecuador from on-going arbitral proceedings by ICSID tribunals.
47 See AC GARCÉS DEL POZO, EL ALCANCE DE LA PROHIBICIÓN DEL ARTÍCULO 422 DE LA CONST IT UCIÓN COMO
MECANISMO PARA BLINDAR AL EST ADO DEL A RBITRAJE INT ERNACIONAL 67 (Aug. 2011) (unpublished LL.B. thesis,
Universidad San Francisco De Quito), available at http://repositorio.usfq.edu.ec/bitstream/23000/1214/1/101030.pdf
(“President Rafael Correa made a request to the National Assembly for denouncing the Bilateral Reciprocal
Protection of Investments that Ecuador signed with Finland, Sweden, Can ada, China, Netherlands, Germany,
France, the United Kingdom and Ireland, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Switzerland and the United States.”
(translation by author)).
48 See GOMEZ , supra note 29, at 18, n.49; see also U.N. CONF. TRADE & DEV., W ORLD INVEST MENT REPORT 2008:
TRANSNAT IONAL CORPORATIONS AND T HE INFRAST RUCTURE CHALLENGE 65 nn.107, 108 (2008); KARST EN
NOWROT , INT ERNATIONAL INVEST MENT LAW AND THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR: FROM A RBIT RAL BILAT ERALISM T O
JUDICIAL REGIONALISM 6 (MLU Institut für Wirtschaftsrecht 2010), available at http://telc.jura.unihalle.de/sites/default/files/altbestand/Heft_96.pdf.
49 See id.
50 See Álvaro Galindo & Francisco Endara, Ecuador, in RECOGNIT ION AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL A RBIT RAL A WARDS IN LAT IN A MERICA: LAW , PRACT ICE AND LEADING CASES 121, 123 n.12 (Omar E.
García-Bolívar & Hernando Otero eds., 2014). For the most recent account of the Constitutionality of Ecuador’s
BITs as compiled within the recently leaked document of the Commission for Citizen In tegral Audit of the Treaty of
8

that the government and Court’s usage of Article 422 as a launching point for the declaration of
unconstitutionality regarding their international agreements did not realize in a full repudiation of
their obligations, several of which remain on the books and in force,51 as the next section will touch
upon.
The fervor behind Article 422 continues to the present. In May 2013, Correa created, by executive
decree,52 a joint government-civil society commission to audit Ecuador’s bilateral investme nt
treaties and the country’s obligations under the international arbitration system. 53 The
Commission, referred to as CAITISA,54 was comprised of a mixture of investment lawyers, civil
society representatives, and government officials. Following its launch in October 2013, CAITISA
set to its task of determining the “legality, legitimacy and lawfulness of investment treaties, rules
and Ecuador’s commitments, and the possible inconsistencies and irregularities in the decisions of
arbitration tribunals that . . . caused negative impacts to the Ecuadorean state.”55 It is important to
note, though, that the majority (eight of twelve individuals) of the Commission’s compositio n
came from outside the domestic government56 and—surprisingly, perhaps—a higher percentage
were non-Ecuadorians than natives.57
At first glance, the fact that the Ecuadorian government needed to establish a Commission to
review BITs and the ISDS framework in early 2013 is not readily explainable from a legal
(domestic) or institutional standpoint. For, beginning in 2008, Ecuador’s Constitutional Court
started reviewing the ISDS framework under the power granted to it by the country’s constitutio n.
The Court already served as an apex judicial entity equipped with sufficient review powers to deal
away with the country’s entire BIT lattice.58 In only two years’ time, the same Constitutiona l
Reciprocal Protection of Investments and the System of International Arbitration Responsible Investment, see
COMISIÓN PARA LA A UDITORÍA INT EGRAL CIUDADANA DE LOS TRAT ADOS DE PROT ECCIÓN RECÍPROCA DE
INVERSIONES Y DEL SIST EMA DE A RBITRAJE EN M ATERIA DE INVERSIONES, CAITISA CONCLUSÍONES (Dec. 2015),
available at https://issuu.com/periodicodiagonal/docs/conclusiones_caitisa [hereinafter CAITISA CONCLUSÍONES].
51 Compare BURGHARD ILGE , TO CHANGE A BIT IS NOT ENOUGH: ON T HE NEED T O CREATE SOUND POLICY
FRAMEWORKS FOR INVEST MENT 18 (2015), http://www.s2bnetwork.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/To_Change_a_BIT_is_not_enough_sept_2015_HR.pdf, with ECUADOR BITS, UNCTAD
INVEST MENT POLICY HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/61 (last visited May 15, 2016).
52 Créase La Comisión Para La Auditoría Integral Ciudadana De Los Tratados De Protección Recíproca De
Inversiones Y Del Sistema De Arbitraje Internacional En Materia De Inversiones Caitisa (R.O. 958, May 21, 2013)
(Ecuador), available at http://decretos.cege.gob.ec/decretos/decretos.aspx?id=2009 (“Decree 1506”; search by
selecting “Período 2009-2013,” entering “1506” for “Número de Decreto” and hitting search field).
53 See U.N. CONF. TRADE & DEV., TOWARDS A REPOSIT ORY OF POLICY OPT IONS FOR IIA REFORM (2015),
http://unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/CAITISA.pdf.
54 The acronym results from the organization’s Spanish name. See Andres G. Arauz, Ecuador’s Experience with
International Investment Arbitration, SO. CT R. INV. POL’Y BRIEF, Aug. 2015, at 1, available at
http://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/IPB5_Ecuador%E2%80%99s -Experience-with-IntlInvestment-Arbitration_EN.pdf.
55 See Arauz, supra note 54.
56 See U.N. CONF. TRADE & DEV., supra note 53.
57 See id.
58 Under the 2008 Constitution, constitutional judgments contain mandatory binding precedent upon all Ecuadorian
legislation, see 3RD CONGRESS W ORLD CONF. ON CONST . JUST ICE, QUEST IONNAIRE – REPLY BY T HE
CONST IT UTIONAL COURT OF ECUADOR 4 (Oct. 1, 2014),
9

Court, a court with “the power to declare the unconstitutionality of laws through constitutio na l
challenges, consultations of norms, and automatic constitutionality control,”59 had already wielded
Article 422 in its judicial review of Ecuador’s BIT and declared certain provisions of several BITs
unconstitutional.60 A separate institution housed in the executive, separate from the judicial branch,
would seem superfluous by 2013—had the government followed through on the Constitutio na l
Court decrees and terminated the then-unconstitutional framework of BITs.
Nevertheless, the executive administration created CAITISA, which set about dilige ntly
“reviewing” the country’s BITs and determining the effects ISDS had on Ecuador. This paper
posits that the establishment of CAITISA parallels a theme running throughout this paper:
Ecuador’s “re-”reviewing of its BIT commitments was a doubling down by the government—a nd
perhaps a necessary one—to stir up the necessary political resolve to resist foreign investme nt
tribunals and the trappings of the international dispute settlement system.
For, as far as public international law goes, Ecuador remains a party to several BITs to this date—
treaties and treaty clauses that remain in force despite their unconstitutional nature at home.61 This
fact comes as a surprise, given Ecuador’s decision in 2008 to inform nine countries—Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania and
Uruguay—of its denunciation of the BITs concluded with them;62 and given that it followed suit
in 2010 by concluding its agreement with Finland to follow the Constitutional Court’s declaration
of its unconstitutionality.63 Nevertheless, perhaps against expectation, Ecuador did not likewise
follow other, similar proclamations of the Court, and forewent unilaterally terminating each and
every BIT relationship declared unconstitutional by the Court,64 leaving several such BITs in force.
Those agreements, which are to the present day still in force, continue to subject Ecuador to the

http://www.venice.coe.int/WCCJ/Seoul/docs/Ecuador_CC_reply_questionnaire_3WCCJ-E.pdf, which seems to
suggest that the unconstitutional declaration by the Court of the bilateral investment treaties precludes any need to
create a separate entity to review the BITs.
59 Id. at 1. Note that the Constitutional Court established by the 2008 Constitution is unlike the previous document’s
Constitutional Tribunal, which merely “issued resolutions (that did not constitute precedent) and did not have judges
but tribal members.” See id. at 3.
60 See Galindo & Endara, supra note 50, at 123.
61 See ECUADOR BITS, supra note 51 (listing all BITS that are still in force globally); see also NOWROT , supra note
48, at 25.
62 See Karsten Nowrot, Termination and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements, in SHIFT ING
PARADIGMS IN INT ERNATIONAL INVEST MENT LAW : M ORE BALANCED, LESS ISOLAT ED, INCREASINGLY DIVERSIFIED
227, 233 (Steffen Hindelang & Markus Krajewski eds., 2016) [hereinafter SHIFT ING PARADIGMS].
63 See id.
64 Note that the avenues, as a matter of international investment law, available to Ecuador—regarding BITs of which
it no longer wished to be a part—are few. Upon a finding of incompatibility between the ISDS arbitration clause and
Article 422 by the Constitutional Court, the administration would presumably either need to renegotiate the BIT
relationship with the appropriate state, or unilaterally terminate it. Both are costly ventures, as seen in Ecuador’s
experience, described below. For a brief description of the options available to a nation who wishes to amend an
investment treaty, and accompanying theoretical framework explaining those options, see generally Yoram Z. Haftel
& Alexander Thompson, When Do States Renegotiate International Treaties? The Case of Bil ateral Investment
Treaties (Working Paper Univ. Md., 2013), available at
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/workshop/papers/Thompson_CIDCM_2013.pdf.
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dominant international dispute settlement paradigm—notwithstanding official declarations by the
country’s highest Court of their unconstitutionality and conflict with Article 422.65
An exploration into the possible constitutional reasoning why such treaties remain in force follows
in the next section—and is supported primarily by a textual analysis of Article 422 itself. Before
turning to the analytic exercise of interpreting constitutional drafting, however, this paper makes
a minor aside. It seeks to soften, in some ways, the stark, largely defiant lattice of investme nt
treaties that Ecuador maintains on the books despite their constitutionally outstanding nature, by
briefly outlining the touch political environs of present-day Ecuador.
Tough political and diplomatic choices face the President and National Assembly of a developing
South American oil-rich, but economically diversity-poor, country. Both non-judicial branches
walk a dangerous tightrope. Ecuador’s internal economy—heavily dependent on investments in
its extractive industry66 —bestows vast significance upon investment treaties.67 Faced with the
decision to either unilaterally terminate or renegotiate the majority of investment treaties currently
on the books,68 the government may seek to avoid making that choice at all costs. Unilatera l
termination of vital investment treaties would prove disastrous to an already-volatile economy—
while renegotiation, the other option typically available to states seeking to amend their investme nt
treaties, is similarly difficult.69 This problem compounds further given the specific importance that
investors place on the protections and procedural rights of BIT clauses making available
international investment treaty arbitration. 70 At least in this narrow case,71 not following the orders
of the Constitutional Court to remove unconstitutional BIT clauses might prove politically less

65

Compare Galindo & Endara, supra note 50, with ECUADOR BITS, supra note 51. Comparing the lists and focusing
upon the lengthy list on the UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub page of still “in force” agreements, reveals that
several of the Court decisions have not been heeded; namely, United Kingdom, China, Sweden, the Netherlan ds,
France, Venezuela, Chile, Switzerland, Canada, the United States, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Spain, and Italy all
remain on the books, despite the proclamation of the Court of the relevant parts of each agreement as
unconstitutional.
66 See Mary Elizabeth Whittemore, The Problem of Enforcing Nature’s Rights Under Ecuador’s Constitution: Why
the 2008 Environmental Amendments Have No Bite, 20 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 659, 662–63; see also
SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 37, at 152–56 (describing how Correa saddled up in 2011 to sign the country’s “first
large-scale mining project with Chinese-owned Ecuaorriente, agreed to the construction of a hydropower project
with China’s Harbin Electric International, and isnged contracts with US-based Schlumberger and Argentina’s
Tecpetrol worth US $1.7 billion to develop mature oil reserves” (internal citations omitted)).
67 See Michelle Caruso-Cabrera, Ecuador's Rafael Correa Pushes for Foreign Investment, CNBC (Oct. 15, 2015),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/15/ecuadors -rafael-correa-pushes-for-foreign-investment.html.
68 See ECUADOR BITS, supra note 51.
69 See note 63.
70 See Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law , 19 PAC.
M CGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 340 (2007) (suggesting that the availability of investment treaty
arbitration may not directly trigger foreign direct investment but it serves as one factor in an investors decisional
matrix).
71 And, with recourse to no other consequences besides tho se contemplated in the above paragraph.
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difficult for the Executive than alternatively following through on the former’s constitutio na l
decree.72
Ecuador’s government, thus, approaches the role of investment treaties in its national economy
with pragmatism. It makes the correct political movement (with alacrity), calling for constitutio na l
provisions to be placed inside the 2008 constitution, forcing itself to refrain from “ceding
sovereignty.” In this sense, the government declares itself bound, or “pre-committed,” to retaining
its own sovereignty: all it needs in future investment treaty negotiations is to reference its national
constitution—which might provide a bargaining chip on the table.
This decision is easier for the executive to make than actually scrubbing the country clean of its
international obligations. Such a move would expend endless amounts of international good will
and will achieve draining the well of foreign investment—the latter an obvious economic disaster.
Alternatively, the call for a revision of the constitution, complete with an anti-investment dispute
settlement article, demonstrates commitment without having to expend effort internationally.
The whole process73 of submitting existing BITs to the Constitutional Court for judicial review is
similarly pragmatic. As the Court proclaims certain clauses of agreements unconstitutional, the
government can curry favor domestically with its general voting constituencies while neglecting
to accompany its domestic action with any corresponding alteration in the international framework
of investment treaty—so long as it hints that it is seeking to “renegotiate” the treaties as such.
These renegotiations are elusive, however.74 As the example of negotiations between Ecuador and
the United States demonstrates,75 the government can ably drag its feet when it comes to following
through with constructing viable alternatives—to the point that the government’s inaction de facto

72

This is to suggest that the gambit that the President/executive branch (and to a lesser extent, the legislature)
runs—by following through and terminating/amending the investment treaties —is greater than the gambit it runs
when it decides to disregard the declaration of unconstitutionality. The first ends assuredly in a damaged domestic
economy, and ensures the public voting them out of office. In this regard, the executive might have calculated that it
would face less by answering to the apex judicial institution, the Constitutional Court, if ever it were to seek to
enforce its decisions. This last observation hints at a sad reality of the Ecuadorian judiciary worth mentioning. The
country’s Constitutional Court, only years into its existence (i.e. the 2008 constitution created the institution), has
already obtained a less-than-stellar track record, and has been see as unreliable for the adjudging of constitutional
grievances. See Whittemore, supra note 67, at 671–75 (noting infrastructural problems within the Court that has
made it “vulnerable and unstable,” and which have “eroded judicial independence” in the institution).
73 Or, cynically, the whole “theatrics” of Ecuador’s judicial review.
74 This point lends itself heavily from the observations made by Van Harten. “[O]bviously someone negotiated the
[investment] treaties with a degree of appreciation of their consequence and recommended their approval by
ministers or by the governing party in the legislature.” GUS VAN HART EN, INVEST MENT TREATY A RBITRATION AND
PUBLIC LAW 178 (2007). In a similar way, someone is (re)negotiating the treaties, with an appreciable understanding
of the consequences of not reaching a final amending to the BIT, with a possible eye on maint aining the status quo.
75 In the U.S. State Department’s 2015 Investment Climate Report—the latest Report available at the time of
writing—the putative “renegotiation” of the United States -Ecuador BIT was declared non-existent. See U.S. DEP ’T
ST ., ECUADOR INVEST MENT CLIMATE STATEMENT 2015 (June 2015),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241754.pdf. Also note that declaration of “non-existence” comes from
the perspective of the United States, the nation/negotiating entity to which the Ecuadorian gove rnment has been
mandated to renegotiate (i.e. by the Court’s declaration of unconstitutionality).
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maintains the status quo.76 That these negotiations are rarely made public, the government can
declare its public intention without needing to enact any change.
III.

The Inability of Article 422 to “Re-Statify” ISDS

This paper now turns to the text of Article 422. As written, the article is unable to “re-statify”
international ISDS for Ecuador. It does not remove Ecuador from ongoing proceedings, does not
affirmatively remove active bilateral investment treaties, and ambiguously deals with putative
treaty claims arising from the country’s investment treaty obligations. And, most importantly,
Article 422 leaves open the backdoor to regional arbitration under an exception found in 422(2).
In each of these ways, Ecuador’s constitutional mechanism’s own language prevents the country
from “re-statifying” international ISDS. Accordingly, Article 422 serves only as a partial rejection
of investor-state arbitration: it fails to completely unyoke the country from the jurisdiction of
outside investment arbitration bodies.
The next section builds out this claim by exploring four distinct textual aspects of the article77 left
unaccounted for by the CA drafters, each of which detracts from its motivating goal of resisting
the dominant ISDS paradigm.
A. Article 422’s inability to remove Ecuador from ongoing, already-initiated arbitration
proceedings
The easiest example of the above claim rests in existence of numerous outstanding ICSID claims
brought against Ecuador. At the time of writing, fourteen cases against either the Republic itself
or its national public sector entities are still meandering through the ICSID’s arbitration process,
often taking circuitous routes to completion. 78 These cases, though admittedly outside the
crosshairs of Article 422, keep alive the specter of neoliberalism. As the arbitration proceedings
progress, each step invites Ecuador’s government and citizens to unwelcome reminders of the
country’s unsuccessful decoupling from the dominant ISDS paradigm. Cases initiated prior to
2008, marking the passage of Article 422, cannot be touched nor constitutionally resisted on
grounds of the constitutional mechanism. 79
76

See id. (announcing, from the U.S. State Department to United States investors, the safe nature of investment in
the Ecuadorian economy).
77 Note that this piece is not the first to have attempted detailed analyses of the entire article’s text, which is deeply
telling. Constructions of the text, along with legal interpretations and cultural implications have been considered
thoroughly elsewhere as well. See, e.g., GOMEZ, supra note 29, at 6–14.
78 See ICSID Pending Cases, INT ’L CT R. FOR SET T LEMENT OF INV. DISPUT ES,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx (check “Ecuadorian” in
“Respondent(s) Nationality(ies)” field; click search) (last visited May 15, 2016).
79 This mostly self-apparent observation is buttressed by the norm of investment tribunal jurisdiction that states that
consent (actual included) to the settlement of a dispute is the touchstone to jurisdiction. See Sadie Blanchard, State
Consent, Temporal Jurisdiction, and the Importation of Continuing Circumstances Analysis into International
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B. Article 422’s silence regarding retroactive application of its prohibition on ceding
sovereignty or of any requirement to affirmatively remove existing bilateral investment
treaties that directly contradict 422(1)
In its strongest sense, the text of article 422(1) serves only as an affirmative prohibitio n
prospectively. Plainly, it declines the option for the government to offer to cede “sovereign
jurisdiction” in future investment treaties. As such, the article operates as an active restriction on
Ecuador only from entering into such treaties that would then, at that point, obligate the state to
relinquish sovereign jurisdiction.
Tellingly, the article does not make clear its intentions for treaties that are not prospective, but,
instead, are in force at the moment when the article passes into existence.80 And, nowhere does its
prohibition extend to treaties or international instruments that have already been entered into or
given force prior to the passage of Article 422. In effect, this means that the article does not
contemplate international investment treaties that entered into force before it, itself, had
For, as written, Article 422 is not self-executing. It lacks any interpretive, non-preambulatory text
demanding real action from any governmental institution—beyond that they refrain from future
action. It does not charge any single branch with animating Article 422; thus, no single branch will
expend political will to give it bite.81
President Correa’s request to the National Assembly to invalidate the BITs on the books 82 was
returned for similar reason. When the Executive branch presented the request, the legisla ture
stalled. The momentum behind the President’s request (i.e. an expenditure of political capital) was
ultimately thwarted. The legislature hid behind their own lack of mandate, and hung Article 422
on the hook of its own ambiguous, unclear text. Instead of acting on the request by the Correa,
they instead looked to the judiciary and ably refrained from acting. They claimed the insuffic ie nt
procedural go-ahead from the judiciary, and left the existing treaties in play.

Investment Arbitration, 10 W ASH. U. GLOBAL ST UD. L. REV. 419, 423 (2011); see also CONVENT ION ON T HE
SET T LEMENT OF INVEST MENT DISPUTES BET WEEN ST ATES AND NAT IONALS OF OT HER ST ATES art. 25, Mar. 18,
1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
80 As pointed out previously, the text leaves, then, an ambiguity concerning periods of time prior to its own passage
(pre-2008).
81 Without such a mandate, the Constitution requires implementing legislation to retroactively apply it. At present,
Ecuador lacks any such legislation. Cf. Omphemetse S. Sibanda, The Promotion and Protection of Foreign
Investment Law Bill: Denunciation of BITs, and the De-Internationalisation of Investor-State Arbitration in South
Africa, 4 BUS. & M ANAGE . REV. 159, 160 (2014). Ecuador, in this manner, stands in marked contrast with South
Africa, where
on 4 November 2013 South Africa published for public comment the Promotion and Protection of
Investment Bill (Bill). Part of the process for a legislative approach toward FDI protection is the
termination of BITs, and the restriction, implied though, on the availability of international
arbitration of state-investor disputes. The Bill stood in draft form and was open to public comment
until 1 February 2014. Id.
82 See body text accompanying supra notes 47–51, 60–64.
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The majority of the country’s major investment agreements are still able to remain in force for
similar reasons—despite the Constitutional Court’s declaration of unconstitutionality. 83 For
Ecuador, not actively removing BITs amounts to residual jurisdictional exposure from the
investment treaties that remain in force to the present day. At present, the country still faces
exposure to the dominant ISDS paradigm.
The exposure is also exacerbated because of the gray zone between Ecuador’s denunciation of the
ICSID Convention on one hand and the state’s BIT’s provision for ICSID arbitration on the other. 84
Executive Decree 1823 (i.e. Ecuador’s unilateral denunciations, as a host state, of the ICSID
Convention) did not invalidate the grounds on which investment contract and commercial claims
can be brought to ICSID. Many BIT agreements have recourse to ICSID arbitration as clauses
nestled within the dispute resolution provisions of the BIT agreement. Investors might still pursue
claims under them, relying on the treaty language of the existing BITs, thus bringing Ecuador
before a tribunal of the dominant ISDS paradigm.
More importantly, in this sense Article 422 makes claims for future, putative commercial and
contractual rights under them still actionable. Ultimately, foreign investors can continue taking
Ecuador to ICSID arbitration for investments that occurred after 2008.85 Any surviving Ecuador
BITs to the present opens the door to the dominant ISDS paradigm for investors’ future contracts
and commercial dispute claims that would have been foreclosed otherwise. Phrased differently:
treaties currently in force provide an avenue for relief that is above and beyond the investor’s
default recourse, had that same treaty not been in force with only a contractual agreement binding
Ecuador to the investment.86
The current investment trade relationship of Ecuador—taken from the perspective of those states
which still have existing BITs with Ecuador on the books—serves as an important datum. Consider
the country’s relationship with the United States, one of its largest trading partners. In its
Investment Climate Statements for the period spanning 2010–14,87 the United States State
83

See CAITISA CONCLUSÍONES, supra note 50.
Which is to say: Ecuador’s denunciation of the ICSID occurred under Article 71 under the Convention. Article 72
of the Convention, which animates and helps interpret Article 71, is ambiguous when it outlines the effects of
denunciations. This ambiguity makes relevant the text of surviving BITs —especially for Ecuador, with its handful.
See CHRIST IAN TIET JE ET AL ., ONCE AND FOREVER? THE LEGAL EFFECT S OF A DENUNCIAT ION OF ICSID 6 (Martin
Luther Halle-Wittenberg School of Law, Inst. Of Econ. L. Res. Paper 74, March 2008),
http://www.wirtschaftsrecht.uni-halle.de/sites/default/files/altbestand/Heft74.pdf. But see CHRIST OPHER F. DUGAN
ET AL ., INVEST OR-ST AT E A RBITRATION 236–41 (2008).
85 See Fernando Cabrera Diaz, Ecuador Prepares for Life After ICSID, While Debate Continues over Effect of Its
Exit From the Centre, INV. TREAT Y NEWS (Sept. 2, 2009), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/08/28/ecuador-preparesfor-life-after-icsid-wh ile-debate-continues-over-effect-of-its-exit -fro m-the-centre/; see also CHRIST IAN TIET JE ET
AL., supra note 92.
86 See JAN OLE M OSS, THE IMPACT OF INVEST MENT TREATIES ON CONT RACTS BET WEEN HOST ST ATES AND FOREIGN
INVEST ORS 81–138 (2011).
87 Compare 2010 Investment Climate Statement – Ecuador, U.S. DEP ’T ST . (2010),
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2010/138060.htm, with 2011 Investment Climate Statement – Ecuador, U.S.
DEP ’T ST . (2011), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157270.htm, 2012 Investment Climate Statement –
Ecuador, U.S. DEP ’T ST . (2012), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191141.htm, 2013 Investment Climate
84
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Department maintains the following to its investors with regards to the BIT relationship between
the United States and Ecuador:
The existing U.S.-Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) provides for binding
international arbitration of disputes between the government and investor in a venue
of the investor's choosing, including the ICSID Convention. Given Ecuador’s 2009
withdrawal from the ICSID Convention, alternative arbitration venues available to
U.S. investors include: ICSID’s Additional Facility; ad hoc arbitration under
UNCITRAL rules; and arbitration administered by any other arbitral institution to
which the parties agree. Should the Ecuadorian government terminate the U.S.Ecuador BIT, the BIT’s provisions would be fully in effect for one year from the
date of termination notice, and for an additional 10 years for investments existing
on the one year anniversary of the termination notice. 88
Though ICSID’s Additional Facility arbitration and ad hoc arbitration under United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules are not as expeditious for the receipt
of the recognition and enforcements of judgment for arbitrated claims compared with the
arbitration available to parties adhering to the ICSID convention, 89 they certainly qualify in large
part as mechanisms of dominant ISDS paradigm—and ones divergent from the spirit of Article
422.
Note that this above analysis stops short of considering the additional exposure brought about by
legal mechanisms that seek to limit the ability of states to peremptorily revoke the protection
offered by investment treaties. These “survival clause” mechanisms, built into most, if not all of
Ecuador’s BITs,90 extend possible ICSID arbitration for investors after the state has revoked the
treaty—thus increasing Ecuador’s potential subjection to ICSID jurisdiction. 91 By virtue of the
existence of these provisions, the substantive and procedural guarantees of the respective BITs
continues to be effective for a further period of ten to fifteen years from the date of terminatio n

Statement – Ecuador, U.S. DEP ’T ST . (2013), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204634.htm, and 2014
Investment Climate Statement – Ecuador, U.S. DEP ’T ST . (2014),
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/227868.htm. Even in the 2015 Report—the latest Investment Climate
Report available to date—the putative “renegotiation” of the US-Ecuador BIT was declared non-existent, and the
status quo of the above maintained. See U.S. DEP ’T ST ., supra note 76.
88 2014 Investment Climate Statement – Ecuador, supra note 95 (emphasis added).
89 See CHRIST OPHER F. DUGAN ET AL ., supra note 92, at 81–90.
90 See NOWROT , supra note 48, at 26–27. As Nowrot explains, the primary reason for the “frequent incorporation of
these ‘survival clauses’ lies in the specific character of the kind of economic transactions addressed by international
investment agreements. As for an example emphasized by Christoph Schreuer and Rudolf Dolzer, ‘[m]aking a
foreign investment is different in nature from engaging in trade transactions. Whereas a trade deal typically consists
in a one-time exchange of goods and money, the decision to invest in a foreign country initiates a long -term
relationship between the investor and the host state.’ . . . [T]he validity of these provisions under current public
international law appears to be beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
91 See generally James Harrison, The Life and Death of BITs: Legal Issues Concerning Survival Clauses and the
Termination of Investment Treaties, 13 J. W ORLD INV. & TRADE 928 (2012).
16

with regard to investments made prior,92 allowing respective foreign investors to launch treaty
claims during that period.
C. Article 422’s ambiguity concerning putative treaty claims that arise from Ecuador’s
investment treaty obligations
In a manner different than described above, Article 422 also does not shield Ecuador from treaty
claims from investment treaties that remain in existence post-2008.93 This category of exposure is
separate from the category described in the previous section. Any aforementioned potential claims
that Ecuador might face would be brought to an ICSID tribunal (or similar international forum)
pursuant to the dispute settlement clause in force (or residually present) within the investme nt
treaty.
This next category of claims that this paper turns to now are a group of second-order claims. They
stand as a category of treaty claims, brought forth by an investor who asks the tribunal to adjudge
whether the host country, in this case Ecuador, breached the investment treaty when it did not
provide the protections that it had promised in the treaty mechanism itself, be it either substantive
(i.e. in the case of indirect expropriation94 ) or procedural (i.e. in the case of providing for ICSID
tribunal arbitration).
In this regard, Article 422(1) has interpretive certainties: it successfully precludes the state from
including offers in future BITs to arbitrate in the supra-national sphere, while also preventing the
state from becoming a future member of international organizations that require such arbitratio n. 95
But, it still has judicially-uninterpreted ambiguities. These involve the unanswered questions
hinted to in the above paragraph of whether Ecuador can be subject to the jurisdiction of arbitral
tribunals adjudicating treaty claims, regarding international conventions to which it once was a
party. Traditionally, this category of treaty claims had been brought alongside (and in addition to)
any contractual or commercial claims brought under the mechanism of the investment treaty. 96 But

92

See NOWROT , supra note 48, at 26–27.
See, e.g., VIENNA CONVENT ION ON T HE LAW OF TREAT IES art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A party
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”). See generally
William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations and National Law: Emerging Conflicts in International
Arbitration, 58 HAST INGS L.J. 251 (2006).
94 See generally SEBAST IÁN LÓPEZ ESCARCENA, INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014). These
types of claims are now being brought creatively against countries, like Ecuador, that have since rescinded their
ICSID signatory status. They are occurring commonly in the contexts of regulatory regimes (like tobacco
regulations), or sovereign debt default. See David Herlihy et al., The Increasing Appeal and Novel Use of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, SKADDEN, Apr. 29, 2013, https://www.skadden.com/insights/increasing-appeal-and-novel-usebilateral-investment-treaties.
95 See GOMEZ , supra note 29, at 6.
96 See Gillman, supra note 33, at 295–96. For a background discussion of how investment treaty claims can impact
or, in this instant case, give rise to jurisdiction on claims arising between host states and foreign investors, see
M OSS, supra note 94, at 9–13, 81–138.
93
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now, with Ecuador stepping away from the ICSID convention, Article 422(1) does not deal with
putative investors who bring this category of treaty claims solely by itself.
Thus, surviving BITs (with amended investor-state dispute settlement clauses), as well as BITs
that Ecuador simply no longer wants to adhere to, provide the potential for claims of this sort
brought by investors who wish to demonstrate that Ecuador violated the protections of the treaty
itself.97 With Article 422 having an ambiguous stance with regards to treaty claims (as opposed to
its distinct stance on their commercial or contract counterparts), ICSID jurisdiction still reaches
into Ecuador. And, increasingly, ISDS tribunals of the dominant paradigm find against Ecuador
for treaty claims. Take, for example, the recent arbitration on Ecuador’s 2009 windfall tax, a fiscal
measure seeking to sharply reduce the profitability of foreign-owned oil operations within
Ecuador. As recently as 2012 and 2014, ICSID tribunals found the tax to constitute as an
expropriation under the wording of the France-Ecuador and US-Ecuador BITs.98
D. Article 422’s allowance of arbitration clauses in trade agreements and investment
contracts under the exception of 422(2) for “regional arbitration entities”
The next subsection considers Article 422 more abstractly than those previous. Mainly, this
subsection argues that the exception found within Article 422 swallows any forward progress the
mechanism sought to make. In allowing an exception for “regional arbitration entities,” as
provided in Article 422(2), the constitutional mechanism has simply relocated—more or less—the
transnational situs for dominant-style ISDS, without effectively transforming the beast.
The exception in Article 422(2) detracts from the spirit of the mechanism in a twofold manner. It
does not inoculate the government from the external pressure of seeking foreign investment, which
creates a particularly strong disincentive for Ecuador to renegotiate unconstitutional BITs from
which it benefits. And, it does not inoculate the government from courting foreign investment by
means of traditional assurances—specifically in this case, BIT clauses that stipulate internatio na l
arbitration as a means to settle investor-state disputes. This allows the Ecuadorian government to
resort to instituting and creating, as evidenced by the push to do so,99 a regional investment dispute
settlement body, the Union of South American Nations Arbitration Centre (UNASUR Center), 100
for which to submit future investor-state disputes.
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For a background on why governments break contracts that then may arise as treaty claims, see RACHEL L.
W ELLHAUSEN, THE SHIELD OF NAT IONALITY: W HEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK CONT RACT S WITH FOREIGN FIRMS 15–
35 (2015). For background on the differences between contractual claims and treaty claims in international
investment arbitration, see generally M ARIEL DIMSEY, THE RESOLUT ION OF INT ERNATIONAL INVEST MENT DISPUTES
44–54 (2008).
98 See Julie Bédard et al., The ‘Law 42’ Arbitrations Against Ecuador and the Importance of BIT Language ,
SKADDEN, Jan. 2015, https://www.skadden.com/insights/law-42-arbitrations-against-ecuador-and-importance-bitlanguage. For another case involving Law 42, see W ELLHAUSEN, supra note 105, at 87.
99 See Grant, supra note 10, at 25–35.
100 See id. at 1–2.
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This section labors to emphasize that the latter of the two scenarios described in the above
paragraph is not consistent with the general spirit motivating Article 422. Regional arbitration, as
embodied by the UNASUR Center, is particularly distinct from a proper “re-statification” of
investor-state disputes. The political will of Ecuador behind enacting Article 422 was to disengage
from the dominant ISDS paradigm. Doing this requires a thorough unyoking from internatio na l
investment dispute arbitration, as well as a proper redirection of the government to create a dispute
body within the country’s territory, or within the exclusive jurisdiction of Ecuador.
This territorial-extraterritorial distinction underlines the different calculus of rights that play out
in both scenarios. A territorial, or “stratified,” or state-centric, investment dispute settlement body,
necessarily has different public law considerations before it than does its international or, in this
case, regional counterpart. As Van Harten makes clear, the latter embodies a “privatization of the
judicial function”101 in the form of transnational adjudication, which serves as a “method of control
alongside domestic courts.”102 This contrasts directly with the former, which, in a theoretical sense,
pursue domestic democratic norms that demand:
i) that the State undertake, or refrain from, certain conduct within its domestic
jurisdiction; (ii) that certain limits be imposed on previously unregulated State
conduct within its jurisdiction; or (iii) that the State prohibit, regulate, or permit
certain conduct by natural persons and legal entities within its jurisdiction. 103
The differences between each approach abound. In essence, the latter frequently promotes the
interests of economic actors headquartered within capital-exporting states above and beyond the
citizen interests of the host states, while the former might seek to re-calibrate those interests of
foreign investors in accordance with interests of their own citizens. The project to “re-statify,” or
domesticate, ISDS, then is a project of resistance,104 which seeks to “countervail the loss of
democratic accountability at supranational levels.”105
The best way to illustrate this point regarding Article 422(2)’s exception is by comparison to its
regional cousin, Article 320 of Bolivia’s 2009 constitution, 106 to which it stands in marked contrast.
101

VAN HART EN, supra note 75, at 177. International arbitration bodies serve not only alongside the (highest)
domestic courts, but above those domestic bodies: the apex court’s rulings are often subject to review by the
international arbitral body. See Peter-Tobias Stoll & Till Patrik Holterhus, The ‘Generalization’ of International
Investment Law in Constitutional Perspective, in SHIFT ING PARADIGMS, supra note 63, at 339, 346. In the case of
the Ecuador-Chevron arbitration, the arbitration tribunal found that the Ecuadorian courts had breached Ecuador’s
BIT obligations. See L Yves Fortier, Investor-State Tribunals and National Courts: A Harmony of Spheres? , in
PRACT ISING VIRT UE: INSIDE INT ERNATIONAL A RBITRATION, supra note 13, at 292, 300–05.
102 See VAN HART EN, supra note 75, at 176 (emphasis added).
103 Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Courts in International Law: The International Judicial Function of National
Courts, 34 LOY. L.A. INT 'L & COMP . L. REV. 133, 138–39 (2011).
104 See generally SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 37.
105 Id. at 164.
106 BOLIVIA CONST ., Art. 320 (2009), available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf.
The relevant text is provided here: Article 320: Bolivian investment is prioritized over foreign investment: (i)
Bolivian investment shall take priority over foreign investment. (ii) Every foreign investment shall submit to
Bolivian jurisdiction, laws and authorities, and no one may cite an exceptional situation, nor appeal to diplomatic
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the anti-dominant ISDS paradigm, Article 320(2), explicitly rejects in its text international (read
extraterritorial)107 arbitration forums. Channeled through Article 410’s definition of both “natural
and legal” persons (ensuring that Article 320(2)’s “no one” extends also to business, corporations,
and other strictly legal persons), Article 320(2) reaches where Ecuador’s Article 422 does not: it
expressly requires that “every foreign investment shall submit to Bolivian jurisdiction, laws and
authorities,”108 whereas Article 422 allows an open door for crafty ponderings of what forum might
sufficiently constitute a “regional [] entity”109 as to fit under the exception described in Article
422(2). Bolivia’s mechanism, then, is surprisingly determinative: by closing off the possibility to
any extraterritorial, non-Bolivian jurisdiction, Article 320(2) affirmatively relocates the situs for
jurisdiction foreign investment within the boundaries of the Bolivian state.
To be clear, this transforms the incentive structures. Bolivian politicians, faced with courting
foreign investment by negotiating international investment treaties, are constitutionally prohibited
from employing the favorite incentive: the jurisdictional clause providing for internatio na l
investment arbitration. In a figurative sense, the constitutional mechanism has thus removed the
bargaining chip of the dominant ISDS paradigm from Bolivia’s treaty negotiation toolkit. This was
not the case for Ecuadorian politicians, who were left room by their mechanism to aptly maneuver
the negotiating table and speak soft assurances in the ears of investors about how favorable
“regional entities” might be to investor interests.
As such, Article 320(2) serves as a heavy-hitting antithesis to the system of the dominant ISDS
paradigm, whereas Article 422 was not. Article 320(2) places the burden squarely on Bolivia to
re-imagine an ISDS paradigm within their own borders that can somewhat still attract foreign
investment. Ecuador’s Article 422(2) allows Ecuadorian politicians to hide the ball from their
citizens and not re-envision the country’s international investment strategy.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Ecuador’s current situation is the result of the “gaps [of Article 422(1)] in
comparison to the radical position of the . . . Constituent Assembly on [international investme nt
treaty arbitration].”110 The country still finds itself subject to the jurisdictional domain of

claims to obtain a more favorable treatment. (iii) The economic relations with foreign states or enterprises shall be
carried out under conditions of independence, mutual respect and equity. More favorable conditions may not be
granted to foreign States or enterprises than those established for Bolivians. (iv) The State acts independently in all
of its decisions on internal economic policy, and shall not accept demands or conditions imposed on this policy by
states, banks or Bolivian or foreign financial institutions, multilateral entities or transnational enterprises. Id.
107 Primarily, in the sense discussed in Section 3. The Inability of Article 422 To “Re-Statify” ISDS, supra.
108 BOLIVIA CONST ., Art. 320(2) (2009).
109 See supra notes 107–08.
110 GOMEZ , supra note 29, at 7; see also Gillman, supra note 33, at 291 (citing Vicente Peralta who stated that the
position of the Correa government was to prohibit investor-state arbitration altogether, following the principles laid
out in the Calvo Doctrine).
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investment treaty arbitral tribunals, in direct contradiction to the motivating spirit behind the
enactment of Article 422.
At this point, doubt is properly cast not only on Article 422 as an instrument to properly “re-statify”
ISDS, but also upon constitutional mechanism’s dominant narrative generally. Put simply: Article
422 cannot be viewed in a strict sense as a constitutional “pre-commitment” on the Ecuadorian
government’s ability to engage with the economic forces of globalized trade, or its ability to
entangle itself with future international trade obligations. As a factual, empirical, descriptive
matter, Ecuador is still very much engaged with the international commercial and investme nt
world.
A substitute explanation, offered in the concluding paragraphs of this paper, considers Article 422
instead as an environmentally- inclusive social contract—i.e. as a responsive legal mechanism of
sorts (like any other, e.g. statutes or regulations) that aims to curb the deleterious effects of
international investment projects upon Ecuador’s environment, its landscape, and its people. In
this sense, Article 422 is not viewed as a full constitutional mechanism absolutely ensuring and
securing territorial sanctity. Nor can it be viewed as a constitutional arrangement that can insulate
the government from its international obligations. Nor can it truly inoculate the government from
the external pressures of neoliberal economics. 111
Rather, it is seen as an article, like others in the 2008 Constitution which embrace the SK ideology.
It strengthens self-governance capacity, but it does so in a way that a social mantra might. A social
mantra that has reached the level of a governance instrument. In conclusion, while Article 422 a)
aims formally to preserve Ecuador’s sovereignty concerns, and b) textually promises to disentangle
itself from the interlocking web of international investment treaties, in effect it serves mostly as
an optimistic, constitutional banner for the social Sumak Kawasy ideology and the Buen Vivir
movement.

The coup de grâce, if not already presented by Article 422’s institutional inability of Ecuador to dismantle the
BIT framework that still subjects the country to ISDS, is the external economic pressures that Ecuador itself is
unable to resist. The Ecuadorian government has indicated it may be open to negotiating international arbitration
clauses within individual contracts, as provided for under the Production Code and the Planning and Public Finance
Code—without qualifying in advance the particular ISDS mechanism to which it expects to consent. Similarly, the
recent experience of extraction industries, heavily concentrated around a handful of certain investors, indicates the
country’s possible incorrigible relationship with the international neoliberal economic system.
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